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Post Secularism and the Woman Question 
(Review of Saba Mahmood’s book “Politics of Piety: Islamic 
Revival and the Feminist Subject” (2005)1 
 
       Lama Abu Odeh 
 
I will discuss the “woman question in post secularism” by offering my 
critique of Saba Mahmood’s book “Politics of Piety: The Islamic 
Revival and the Feminist Subject”. But before I do so, let me just state 
that I am a legal academic and I am not a reader of the field of 
anthropology. I am unfamiliar with the theoretic jargon of the 
discipline- even less so of the jargon of the subfield, anthropology of 
religion from which Politics of Piety hails. Each discipline is 
autonomous more so fields of study within each discipline. Those 
fields usually coalesce around a celebrity figure of a theorist who 
originates a theoretic language that his or her mentees use to signal 
their affiliation with this field. Critique of the celebrity figures of the 
field usually occurs by way of addition, modification, and 
complexification and rarely in the form of radical critique. Radical 
critique is usually costly for those affiliated with a field because of the 
way academia is organized. One needs the reference letter, the 
invitation to a conference, and the book review. This is all to say that 
Politics of Piety may have already been subject to a great deal of 
critique-addition/modification/complexification, sadly being an 
outsider and missing the subtleties of exchange between mentors and 
mentees within the anthropology of religion, I am unaware of any of it.  
 
The book: Politics of Piety was published in 2005 and has had a great 
and successful career in EuroAmerican academia. One sees it cited 
everywhere- and I mean everywhere- typically in the context of 
denouncing Western feminism-sometimes one sees the word 
“secular” inserted between “Western” and “feminism= or in asserting 
a counter and different kind of feminism to the Western one2. The 
book, which anthropologizes the piety movement among women in 
the nineties of the twentieth century, namely, the women of the 
mosque in Egypt, has never been translated to Arabic. It has been 
more than a decade since its publication and has had a huge and 
formative effect on a whole generation of academics in EuroAmerican 
Academia especially among those interested in the study of Islam and 
Muslims and yet seems to have had a bare life in the Arab world. It 
appears that a book that talks about an Arab phenomenon has caused 
                                                        
1 Talk presented at the conference “Religion, Politics and Critique: Comparative Political Theology”, 
the American University of Beirut (AUB), Feb 20-21, 2019 
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an explosion in the West but has landed a DUD in the Arab world.  The 
question is why? 
 
I will try to present my critique of the book without falling into the 
trap Saba Mahmood, its author, laid out for the critic of her thesis. In 
the book, SM used the case of the Egyptian pious women of the 
mosque with whom she had repeated “ethnic encounters” in the 90s 
to critique the secular/liberal/feminist assumptions that undergird 
the critique of the Muslim revivalist movements in general and the 
female piety movements in particular. It is a trap because anything 
you say by way of critique can be returned back to you, by the author 
of the book, as a form of “secular/liberal/feminist” bias. For it is SM”s 
project in the book to show that the piety movement is an 
instantiation of a completely different epistemological grid from that 
of its critics that can only be comprehended on its own terms. To 
critique the movement by using terms from a counter epistemological 
grid-such as secularism/liberalism/feminism is to be already guilty of 
misrecognition.  To say for instance that the women of piety are 
submissive to patriarchal authority is to be already wedded to the 
epistemological grid of secular feminist liberalism and your critique 
instantly fails or rather slides unnoticed along the scaffolding of these 
pious women’s own way of knowing the world. At best you are 
ignored-unheard, unseen- and at worst you exemplify in your critique 
an error of judgment that is motivated by your own epistemological 
spectacles. The problem put simply is that you used YOUR terms to 
understand THEIRS and the goal is to get you to shed your bias by 
unknowing what you know in order for you to know what you need to 
know.  
 
To avoid the trap I will instead try to show the internal incoherence of 
the argument made in the book. This goes back to my own training as 
a critical lawyer. One of the first inductions I received in being a crit: 
you need to show the internal incoherence of the argument not just 
that the representation doesn’t match the fact as you see them. And 
this is what I will try to do in this short presentation. 
 
But I am getting ahead of myself. Let me first describe in my own 
words what the book is about.  
 
According to Saba Mahmood the women who joined the piety 
movement she studied saw themselves as rebelling against, as they 
put it, the increasing Westernization and secularization of Egyptian 
culture. The lessons they received from the Daaya in the mosque was 
the medium through which they learnt to replace this knowledge, 
piece by piece, with an alternative Islamic one. In short the lessons 
helped these women to know the world, or rather re-know it, their 
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own private one that -included their men- and the public one, 
Islamically.  
 
The lessons usually took place in a particular mosque in both upper 
and working class neighborhoods and included jurisprudential 
discussions that covered topics that were of interest to the women 
attending those lessons. Those topics included the proper way to 
dress, the proper way to be in male company at the university or the 
workplace, how to deal with an un-pious husband and whether to 
attend an establishment that served alcohol. When the lesson ended, 
prayers were held, often led by the Daaiya herself. Those lessons took 
place several times a week and women who attended them often 
found themselves in conflict with husbands or family who were 
disapproving of the transformation effected on these women and their 
bodies through the regular attendance of those lessons. Despite 
opposition, those women persisted, and how to resist family pressure 
became one of the regular topics raised in those lessons.  
 
In the book Saba Mahmood proposes that we understand the piety 
movement as a discourse of ethics that produces its own subjects. 
More so, it is a discourse that produces the very body that performs 
its dictates. Through repeated performances of the dictates of this 
discourse, the body is produced over and over again. 
 
By way of example of piety’s ethical discourse, Mahmood describes 
two different ethical registers women are advised to use to resist 
adversity: one is the moral high ground, and the other is sabr, 
patience. Make the husband feel guilty and if that doesn’t work, be 
patient.  
 
 
If we take the veil that the women of the mosque donned as an 
expression of their membership in the movement, SM proposes that it 
would amount to nonsense to say, by way of feminist critique, 
something like “The veil restricts the movement of these women”.  
That sentence would be one plucked out of a secular liberal feminist 
text in which the veiled subject precedes the discourse of the veil and 
in which the agency to move as one wishes is considered a precious 
right. To say that would be to understand it backwards according to 
Mahmood. Rather than “the veil restricts the movement of these 
women” it is that “the veil produces the woman or the body for whom 
restriction of movement is a desired pious goal.” And if one were hung 
up on “agency” what agency there is, is an agency to submit. Welcome 
to the world of social conservatism she seems to say, it has its own 
internal logic that you need to understand if you want to influence. 
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What is interesting about SM’s theory is that in its attempt to 
represent the piety movement as performative ethics it does so on the 
terms of this movement’s own idealistic terms. It reproduces the 
movement in theoretical terms ideally. There is no hint of critique. No 
sign of interest in noting failure of performance for the purpose of 
undoing the discourse of the piety movement. To the contrary, 
Mahmood posits that failure of performance can be remedied through 
more performances to master the ethics the discourse promotes. This 
Mahmood insists on to distinguish her reading of the piety movement 
as discourse from the reading of her mentor Judith Butler of 
heteronormativity as discourse. While Butler, also argues that 
heteronormativity produces its own subjects by creating a necessary 
link between sex, gender, and desire, she nevertheless, driven by the 
desire to undo heteronormativity, looks for failure of performance to 
signal the locus of this undoing.  
 
But Mahmood entertains no such desire when it comes to the piety 
movement. Her theoretic framing rather than offering critique for the 
purpose of undoing, offers flattery- the discourse of piety is capable of 
producing perfect subjects, Mahmood asserts. No failure of 
performance is referred to by the theorist to show the discourse’s will 
to power.  
 
Accordingly, SM’s refrain to feminists who might be tempted to do just 
that is to say either a) if you want to intervene in the discourse of 
piety you have to do it on this discourse’s own terms or alternatively 
b) and there she tightens the screws on feminist critique, the 
discourse of piety is so productive of its subjects that it becomes 
coded into the body- to undo it you have to “retune” the body itself. 
No easy task! 
 
But turning a discourse theoretically into an epistemological closure, 
making interventions in it conditional on the discourse’s own term is 
to make intervention impossible. It is as if SM wants to say these 
women were tone deaf to feminist discourse. 
 
A theoretic work that endows on its object discourse a closure so 
perfect that makes any serious change impossible is theoretic work 
that matches its object perfectly. 
 
On the other side, interestingly, Saba Mahmood makes secularist 
discourse porous and open to change-after all that’s precisely what 
the women of piety were doing and quite successfully apparently-they 
used to be non religious and became so, they used to be non veiled 
and became so. By making secularism porous and open to change 
against the grain of her initial claim that secularism and piety form 
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two opposing epistemological grids, she signals her approval of the 
shift in these women’s lives.  
 
The pious is closed to the secularist agenda of change but the 
secularist is open to the pious agenda of change. And this is where I 
think SM’s thesis is internally incoherent. 
 
If I am right, and SM does more in theory than represent the 
movement but slides into complete identification with it so that she 
comes close to becoming its spokeswoman, the question is why?  
 
It is important to note that the background thesis behind the study of 
women of piety is the claim-by Mahmood- that Western secular liberal 
discourses have reshaped the Muslim world and that is bad. 
Something precious, “Islam, Muslim” was lost and had to be changed. 
This background claim- diagnosis, assessment- corresponds with the 
claim of the women in the piety movement who see westernization 
and secularization all around them and who seek to undo it.  
 
So one way to understand what Mahmood is doing is trading off a 
feminist agenda for a socially conservative one because of the latter’s 
Islamic revivalist effect- sacrificing women in order to salvage a lost 
authentic Islam and that is a project in the heart of identity politics.  
 
A theoretic exercise that begins with proposing two mutual 
epistemological closures but once carried out in effect closes off 
feminist secular intervention by endowing the Islamic pious discourse 
with epistemological closure while opening up the secular liberal one 
to Islamist intervention is a theoretic exercise that merges with the 
claims of the Islamist revival.  
 
This of course begs the question” if the liberal secular is open to 
Islamist intervention why not the Islamist one? 
Specifically as it relates to the women of piety, if they were unveiled 
before they were veiled, why can’t they be unveiled again? If they 
were non pious before why not become un-pious again? 
 
And why is there a trade off of women to secure Islam as identity?  
 
Academic feminism emerging from the ME studies complex is here in 
SM pushed to the breaking point. Those who write within this 
complex have often insisted that modernity has witnessed several 
attempts by Muslim women to engage their own religion 
feministically. To do so they sought to liberalize the hierarchical 
relationships of gender they were born into by appealing to concepts 
of justice and equality in the Quran against the grain of jurisprudential 
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wisdom that asserted otherwise and that were articulated in positive 
family laws throughout the Arab world in the twentieth century. If we 
were to follow SM’s theoretic formulation to its logical end, these 
attempts are either impossible or undesirable. Impossible because of 
conservative social mores are autonomous-unto themselves- can only 
be changed on their own terms, undesirable, because of the problem 
of inserting secularity unto religious discourse, which would be 
frowned upon on revivalist terms. And here we get to what I would 
call the Joseph Massad problematic. Asserting an authentic Islam that 
was despoiled by the West that polices any attempt at inserting 
rights-gay rights/women’s rights- as Euronormative intervention. 
Each gesture of liberality/secularity is denounced as inauthentic, 
which then turns the EuroAmerican academic into the self-appointed 
policeman/woman of feminist and gay activism in the Arab world.  
 
 
 
